

NAME	Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
PHONETICS	HAH-lid SHAKE moo-HAH-mud
KEY ALIAS	Mukhtar
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Baluchi born and raised in Kuwait

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is one of history's most infamous terrorists, and his capture in 2003 deprived al-Qa'ida of one of its most capable senior operatives. He devoted most of his adult life to terrorist plotting, specifically against the United States, and was the driving force behind the attacks on 11 September 2001 as well as several subsequent plots against US and Western targets worldwide.

After graduating from North Carolina A&T State University in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering, KSM traveled to Afghanistan to participate in the anti-Soviet fighting there. KSM joined Yousef in the Philippines in 1994 to plan the "Bojinka" plot—the simultaneous bombings of a dozen US-flagged commercial airliners over the Pacific. After the plot was disrupted and Yousef was caught in early 1995, KSM was indicted for his role in the plot and went into hiding. By 1999, he convinced Usama Bin Ladin to provide him with operatives and funding for a new airliner plot, which culminated in the attacks on 11 September two years later.

- KSM headed al-Qa'ida's Media Committee from 2000 and he helped build close operational ties between al-Qa'ida and the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorist group that was plotting against US and Israeli targets in Southeast Asia.

By late 2001, with the collapse of the Taliban regime and the dispersal of al-Qa'ida's leadership, the prestige associated with engineering the attacks on 11 September propelled KSM into the role of external operations chief for al-Qa'ida.

- In addition to plots targeting Britain, KSM launched several plots targeting the US Homeland, including a plot in late 2001 to have JI suicide operatives hijack a plane over the Pacific and crash it into a skyscraper on the US West Coast; a plan in early 2002 to send al-Qa'ida operatives to conduct attacks in the U.S.; and a plot in early 2003 to employ a network of Pakistanis—including Majid Khan—to smuggle explosives into New York and to target gas stations, railroad tracks, and a bridge in New York.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

08 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (08 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – MUHAMMAD, KHALID SHAYKH

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2,972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

b. The detainee served as the head of the al Qaida military committee and was Usama bin Laden’s principal al Qaida operative who directed the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.

c. In an interview with an al Jazeera reporter in June 2002, the detainee stated he was the head of the al Qaida military committee.

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TRIBUNAL – MUHAMMAD, KHALID SHAYKH

d. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained information about the four airplanes hijacked on 11 September 2001 including code names, airline company, flight number, target, pilot name and background information, and names of the hijackers.

e. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained photographs of 19 individuals identified as the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

f. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a document that listed the pilot license fees for Mohammad Atta and biographies for some of the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

g. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained images of passports and an image of Mohammad Atta.

h. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained transcripts of chat sessions belonging to at least one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

i. The detainee directed an individual to travel to the United States to case targets for a second wave of attacks.

j. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained three letters from Usama bin Laden.

k. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained spreadsheets that describe money assistance to families of known al Qaida members.

l. The detainee's name was on a list in a computer seized in connection with a threat to United States airlines, United States embassies and the Pope.

m. The detainee wrote the *bojinka plot*, the airline bomb plot which was later found on his nephew Ramzi Yousef's computer.

n. The *bojinka plot* is also known as the Manila air investigation.

o. The Manila air investigation uncovered the detainee conspired with others to plant explosive devices aboard American jetliners while those aircraft were scheduled to be airborne and loaded with passengers on their way to the United States.

p. The detainee was in charge of and funded an attack against United States military vessels heading to the port of Djibouti.

q. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a letter to the United Arab Emirates threatening attack if their government continued to help the United States.

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r. During the capture of the detainee, information used exclusively by al Qaida operational managers to communicate with operatives was found.

s. The detainee received funds from Kuwaiti-based Islamic extremist groups and delivered the funds to al Qaida members.

t. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a document that summarized operational procedures and training requirements of an al Qaida cell.

u. A computer hard drive seized during the capture of the detainee contained a list of killed and wounded al Qaida martyrs.

v. Passport photographs of al Qaida operatives were seized during the capture of the detainee.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

NAME	Walid Bin 'Attash
PHONETICS	wah-LEED bin AH-tush
KEY ALIASES	Khallad Bin 'Attash, Silver
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Yemeni, born and raised in Saudi Arabia

Walid Bin 'Attash, best known as Khallad, was a key al-Qa'ida operative from 1998 until his capture in 2003. Khallad, who is 27, is the scion of a prominent terrorist family: his father, Muhammad, was close to Usama Bin Ladin, and several of Khallad's brothers went to Afghanistan to train and fight in the 1990s; two of these brothers were killed—including one during US airstrikes in Afghanistan in late 2001—and another, Hassan, has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since 2004.

Khallad arrived in Afghanistan in about 1995 and trained at a number of camps. In 1996, after Bin Ladin's return to Afghanistan from Sudan, Khallad alternated between serving as a bodyguard for the al-Qa'ida leader and participating in combat against the Northern Alliance; he lost his right leg during a battlefield accident in 1997. In 1998, Bin Ladin began using Khallad operationally, first as the al-Qa'ida leader's intermediary to al-Qa'ida Arabian Peninsula network chief 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri; together during 1998 and 1999, Khallad and Nashiri worked together on the maritime plot that culminated in the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000. In early 1999, Bin Ladin reportedly selected him to become a hijacker in the operation on 11 September 2001, but he was arrested in Yemen in April of that year while attempting to obtain a US visa because local authorities suspected he was a different extremist. Although his brief imprisonment blocked his travel to the United States, Khallad otherwise assisted in the operation, including helping Bin Ladin select additional hijackers and traveling to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok during December 1999-January 2000 to meet with hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar and to take two flights on a US-flagged airliner to assess in-flight security procedures.

- In late 1999, Bin Ladin asked him to help select about two-dozen experienced and reliable operatives for special training at the Mes Ainak camp in Afghanistan; Khallad supervised the training at the camp; many of these operatives went on to participate in prominent operations: one became a suicide bomber in the Cole operation; two were later 11 September hijackers; another was a cell leader who was killed during the suicide bombings in Riyadh in May 2003; and yet another gained renown for his involvement in the bombing of the Limburg in October 2002 and for his plot to assassinate the US Ambassador to Yemen.

After the attacks on 11 September, Khallad helped prepare al-Qa'ida's defenses around Tora Bora, then fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban in late 2001. In early January 2002, Khallad arrived in Karachi, where he served as a communications link between al-Qa'ida's senior leadership and the network in Saudi Arabia—particularly after the detention of al-Nashiri in late 2002—and assisted in the movement of operatives from South and Southeast Asia to the Arabian Peninsula. He also aided efforts by Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to recruit Saudi hijackers for the al-Qa'ida plot to hijack airliners to attack Heathrow Airport.

- In the months before his arrest, Khallad and KSM's nephew 'Ammar al-Baluchi were organizing a plot to carry out simultaneous attacks in Karachi against the US Consulate, Western travelers at the airport, and Westerners residing in the Karachi area. The plot was close to execution when he was detained.

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Department of Defense
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8 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (8 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – BIN 'ATTASH, WALID MUHAMMAD SALIH

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On 7 August 1998, near simultaneous truck bombs were detonated at the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The explosion at the United States embassy in Nairobi resulted in the death of 213 people, including 12 Americans. More than 4,500 people were wounded.

b. Mohammad Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali (Al-Owhali) stated that in approximately June or July 1998, the detainee told him that his (Al-Owhali's) mission was a martyrdom mission, where he would be driving a vehicle filled with explosives into a target which would result in his death. The detainee told Al-Owhali the target was a United States embassy in East Africa, but he was not told the exact country.

c. In 1998, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali was indicted in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, for his involvement in the 7 August 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Charges included conspiracy to kill United States nationals, conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim at places outside the United States, conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against nationals of the United States, conspiracy to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and conspiracy to attack defense utilities.

d. During the latter part of 1999, the detainee facilitated and participated in close-combat training which was held in the Lowgar training camp in Afghanistan. The graduates of the class

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then met with Usama bin Laden who lectured about the operational details of the East Africa bombings.

e. On 12 October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked during refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden by operatives of the al Qaida network. Al Qaida claimed responsibility for the attack. Seventeen United States sailors were killed and 39 other sailors were wounded.

f. Stamps utilized on a forged Yemeni merchant's registration card, which was utilized by the detainee, were forged by a suspect of the USS Cole bombing.

g. A participant in the USS Cole bombing identified the detainee as someone he knew from an al Qaida training camp. The participant in the USS Cole bombing that identified the detainee stated an individual approached him with a letter from the detainee requesting assistance in facilitation of the USS Cole bombing. The participant in the USS Cole bombing claimed the only reason he agreed to assist the individual was due to the letter from the detainee.

h. The detainee went to an al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan in December 2000.

i. An al Qaida cell associated with a senior al Qaida operative used the code name, *father of the leg*, which was a reference to the detainee and the fact that he was missing a leg.

j. A notebook that was seized during the capture of a senior al Qaida operative contained a phone number that was also found in the stored memory of a phone belonging to the detainee.

k. The detainee's University of Islamic Studies identification card was found at an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan.

l. The detainee was implicated in a notebook containing account ledgers for payments made to various al Qaida operatives which was found during a raid of an al Qaida safe house.

m. A source that met the detainee in Afghanistan stated he also saw the detainee at al Farouq training camp. The source stated the detainee worked for an important person in al Qaida and the detainee was a body guard for Usama bin Laden.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

NAME	Ramzi Bin al-Shibh
PHONETICS	Rahm-zee bihn-uhl-SHEEB
KEY ALIASES	Abu Ubaydah, 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdallah Ba' Amar
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Yemeni

Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, a key facilitator for the attacks on 11 September 2001, was a lead operative—until his capture in 2002—in the post-11 September plot conceived of by 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to hijack aircraft and crash them into Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom.

Bin al-Shibh was born in 1972 in southern Yemen. He noted that he was religious from the age of 12 and fought briefly in Yemen's civil war in 1994. After two attempts to immigrate to the United States failed, Bin al-Shibh traveled to Germany, where he applied for political asylum under an assumed name and as a Sudanese citizen. Denied his request for asylum in January 1996, he left Germany and returned to Yemen, where he applied for a visa in his true name. In December 1997, he returned to Germany, where he became a student. In Hamburg, he met hijackers Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah.

Bin al-Shibh, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah traveled to Afghanistan in 1999. In Afghanistan, the four men met Usama Bin Ladin, pledged their loyalty to him, and readily accepted Bin Ladin's proposal to martyr themselves in an operation against the United States. Bin al-Shibh was slated to be one of the 11 September hijacker pilots. He and Atta traveled to Karachi, where they met with KSM.

- After returning to Germany in early 2000, Bin al-Shibh obtained a new passport but was unable to obtain a US visa, despite four attempts. Bin al-Shibh said that in late 2000 he tried to convince a US citizen in San Diego via e-mail to marry him to gain entry into the United States, but Atta convinced him to abandon the idea.

During the eight months before the attacks, Bin al-Shibh was the primary communications intermediary between the hijackers in the United States and al-Qa'ida's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He relayed orders from al-Qa'ida senior operatives to Atta via e-mail or phone, and he met with Atta in Germany in January 2001 and in Spain in July 2001 for in-depth briefings from Atta on the progress of the plot. He also made travel plans to the United States for some of the 11 September terrorists and facilitated the transfer of money to the 11 September terrorists, including convicted terrorist Zacharias Moussaoui. After learning from Atta in late August 2001 of the date of the hijacking attacks, Bin al-Shibh passed the information to KSM.

- A week before the 11 September attacks, Bin al-Shibh left Germany and arrived in Afghanistan three or four days after the attacks. In late 2001, he fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban and began working with KSM in Karachi on follow-on plots against the West, particularly the Heathrow plot. He was tasked by KSM to recruit operatives in Saudi Arabia for an attack on Heathrow Airport, and, as of his capture, Bin al-Shibh had identified four operatives for the operation.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (8 Feb 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – AL-SHIB, RAMZI BIN

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.
2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”
3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.
 - a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
 - b. According to court transcripts and evidence from *United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui*, the detainee was closely associated with three of the hijackers responsible for the “9/11” attacks, Mohammed Atta (Atta), Marwan Al-Shehhi (Al-Shehhi) and Ziad Jarrah while they lived in Hamburg, Germany during the late 1990’s and early 2000. The detainee, Atta and Al-Shehhi are known to have lived at or frequented one particular address during the same time period, 54 Marienstrasse 21073, Hamburg, Germany.

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c. Airline and immigration records indicate that from November 1999 through February 2000, the detainee, Mohammed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah all traveled from Germany to Pakistan.

d. Sayf al-Adl is a senior al Qaida military commander with a long-term relationship with Usama bin Laden. Sayf al-Adl's role in the organization has been as a trainer, military leader, and key member of Usama bin Laden's security detail.

e. The diary of Sayf al-Adl was recovered during a raid in Saudi Arabia in 2004. The diary details the detainee's involvement in the 11 September 2001 terrorist plot and subsequent attack. The detainee is listed as a "highly professional jihadist" along with "9/11 hijackers", Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrah. The diary states that the three were briefed on an operation involving aircraft by Abu Hafs, a senior al Qaida planner. The detainee, Mohammed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah subsequently met with Usama bin Laden about the plan. Following the meeting, al Qaida began arrangements for the detainee, Mohammed Atta and Ziad Jarrah to receive pilot training. The detainee handled administrative details for the "9/11 hijackers" while they were in the United States and the detainee served as an al Qaida Europe based liaison.

f. The detainee was identified in a video tape of potential suicide operatives.

g. The detainee attempted to obtain a United States visa on four occasions from May 2000 to November 2000 for the purpose of attending flight school in the United States. Each application was rejected by United States Department of State.

h. The detainee attempted to enroll in the Florida Flight Training School, where "9/11 hijacker" Ziad Jarrah was a student. The detainee put down a 2,350 United States dollars deposit for flight training.

i. Ziad Jarrah repeatedly attempted to assist the detainee's travel to the United States and enrollment in the Florida flight training center.

j. The detainee also attempted to enroll at the Florida-based aviation language school.

k. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 2708.33 United States dollars on 13 June 2000 via moneygram.

l. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 1803.19 United States dollars on 21 June 2000 via moneygram.

m. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 1760.61 United States dollars on 26 July 2000 via Western Union.

n. The detainee, while in Germany, wired "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi (who was in the United States) 4,118.13 United States dollars on 25 September 2000 via Western Union.

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o. In June 2002, the detainee was personally interviewed by Yosri Fouda (Fouda), an investigative journalist for Al-Jazeera television. The interview took place over the course of 48 hours in Karachi, Pakistan. Also present at the meeting was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), a senior al Qaida planner. Fouda conducted the interview in person with both the detainee and KSM. The detainee and KSM detailed how the “9/11 attacks” were planned and executed during the course of the interview. KSM identified the detainee as the coordinator of the “9/11 attacks.” The detainee displayed items he claimed were “souvenirs” of the “9/11 attacks.” The items included: an air navigation map of the American eastern seaboard, flight simulator CD-Roms and Boeing manuals and a flight instruction book the detainee claimed had “9/11 hijacker” Mohamed Atta’s handwritten notes. The detainee stated Mohamed Atta (Atta) left them in the Hamburg, Germany, apartment he shared with the detainee. The detainee stated that he later met with Atta in July, 2001 in Madrid, Spain, to finalize the operational details of the “9/11 plot.” The detainee stated he received a phone call on 29 August 2001 from Atta that gave the date for the “9/11 attacks.” After learning this, the detainee ordered active al Qaida cells in Europe and elsewhere to evacuate and then he fled to Pakistan.

p. An unsigned letter found at the detainee’s point of capture, and addressed to the detainee, asks follow on questions related to the detainee’s Al-Jazeera interview detailing the “9/11 attacks.”

q. An article from the London Sunday Times published on 8 September 2002 listed excerpts from a 112 page document entitled “The Reality of the New Crusaders’ War.” The detainee passed the document to Al-Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda with a request for the document to be translated into English and entered into the Library of Congress. According to the London Sunday Times the document is al Qaida’s written attempt to justify the “9/11 attacks” through Islamic teaching.

r. The London Sunday Times article published on 8 September 2002 listed excerpts from “The Reality of the New Crusaders’ War” which contained statements from Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar and Usama bin Laden which encourages jihad in service of the ousted Taliban regime.

s. The detainee was captured in a safe house. Items also recovered at the safe house at the time of the detainee’s capture were high explosives, sheet explosives, a large quantity of improvised detonation devices, passports for Usama bin Laden’s family members, a handwritten note to a senior al Qaida operative, identification cards for a senior al Qaida operative, identification cards for Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Haznawi, a “9/11 hijacker,” and contact information for several known al Qaida operatives.

t. Documents captured in a raid of a separate al Qaida safe house were identical to documents captured along with the detainee. The documents included training manuals, security information and combat related subjects.

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u. Letters and personal effects of a senior al Qaida operative were discovered in the safe house where the detainee was arrested.

v. Letters found at the detainee's point of capture detailed a plan to egress Pakistan with forged identification. This plan was in conjunction with a senior al Qaida operative.

w. A letter captured on an al Qaida courier detailed a senior al Qaida operative's instructions to the detainee to identify operatives to send to the United States or United Kingdom.

x. The detainee wired approximately 15,000 United States dollars to Zacharias Moussaoui while Moussaoui was enrolled in pilot training.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

NAME	Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi
PHONETICS	moo-STAH-fah ahl-hah-SOW-ee
KEY ALIAS(ES)	Hashim 'Abd al-Rahman, Zahir, Ayyub, Muhammad Adnan
AFFILIATION(S)	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Saudi

Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi was one of two key financial facilitators entrusted by 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) to manage the funding for the hijackings. As a trusted, respected financial facilitator known to the leadership, al-Hawsawi separately met with Usama Bin Ladin, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Qa'ida spokesman Sulayman Bu Ghayth soon after the attacks on 11 September and had contact with many of al-Qa'ida's most senior managers.

Various reports suggest that al-Hawsawi had direct ties to several of the hijackers and to other operatives, including Ramzi Bin al-Shibh—who delivered some money from al-Hawsawi to the hijackers. In addition, al-Hawsawi and Bin al-Shibh served as a communications link between KSM and the hijackers. He shared a United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based financial account with one hijacker—an account that funded the hijackers' activities in the month before the attacks on 11 September. Four hijackers returned money directly to al-Hawsawi in the week before the attacks, which al-Hawsawi then redeemed in the UAE. Al-Hawsawi also wired thousands of dollars to Bin al-Shibh in the summer of 2001, per KSM's instructions. KSM also maintained his own financial links to al-Hawsawi. In 2001, KSM held a supplemental credit card linked to an al-Hawsawi account based in the UAE.

- Al-Hawsawi worked in the al-Qa'ida media center in Afghanistan from 2000—while it was under the direction of KSM—until he departed for the UAE in early 2001.

After the attacks on 11 September, al-Hawsawi fled the UAE and traveled to Afghanistan and to Pakistan, where he hid until his capture in 2003. KSM reportedly had been providing a safehouse and other logistic support to guarantee al-Hawsawi's security after he arrived in Pakistan.

- Hawsawi facilitated other operatives' travel, including Muhammad al-Qahtani, who was denied entry into the United States in the summer of 2001.
- Hawsawi's close relationship with KSM and the latter's active participation in providing for his security following 11 September suggests Hawsawi was key to KSM's operational team.

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08 February 2007

TO: Personal Representative

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL -- AL HAWSAWI, MUSTAFA AHMED

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2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces."

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2,972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

b. According to United Arab Emirates General Postal Authority records, the detainee opened a Post Office Box, number 19738, in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates on 24 June 2001. He opened the Post Office Box under the name Mustafa Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, date of birth 5 August 1968. He listed his home address as 103 Shaikh Sultan Bin Saqer Street, Al-Butheena, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. He listed his mobile phone as 050-5209905.

c. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 8 September 2001, "9/11 hijacker" Mohamed Atta sent 2,860 United States dollars from Western Union, Safeway Store, 14100

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Baltimore Ave, Laurel, Maryland. The funds were received by the detainee at the Wall Street Exchange, Dubai, United Arab Emirates on 9 September 2001.

d. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 8 September 2001, "9/11 hijacker" Mohamed Atta sent 5,000 United States dollars from Western Union, Food Giant Store, 1009 Fairlawn St., Laurel, Maryland. The funds were received by the detainee at the Wall Street Exchange, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, on 10 September 2001.

e. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 9 September 2001, "9/11 hijacker" Waleed Al-Shehri sent 5,000 United States dollars from Western Union TravelEx #7201, Currency Booth Room 2250, Logan Airport, Boston, Massachusetts. The funds were received by the detainee at the Al-Ansari Exchange, Sharjah United Arab Emirates on 11 September 2001.

f. Recovered Western Union receipts show that on 9 September 2001, "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi sent 5,000 United States dollars from Western Union Greyhound Bus Terminal #0406, 700 Atlantic Ave, Boston, Massachusetts. The funds were received by the detainee at the Al-Ansari Exchange, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates on 11 September 2001.

g. "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta (Atta) sent the detainee a package with Fayeze Banihammad's Automated Teller Machine card and checkbook. One check was endorsed, but not filled in, and split from the checkbook. The Federal Express receipt for this package was recovered from a trash receptacle located at a hotel utilized by Atta. The receipt indicated that the package was sent to the detainee's Post Office box in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.

h. On 11 September 2001, the detainee flew from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan via Pakistan International Airlines flight 212, according to United Arab Emirates immigration records.

i. A handwritten 19 page telephone and address book was found in a laptop computer case associated with the detainee. The address book contained contact information of numerous al Qaida operatives. The document was discovered where a senior al Qaida operative was captured.

j. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained al Qaida expense reports from February 2002 to April 2002.

k. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed information for the families of al Qaida operatives.

l. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed family information of 22 Yemeni al Qaida operatives along with the status of the operatives.

m. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained al Qaida expenditure data from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002.

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n. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained a list of al Qaida members who were killed or wounded.

o. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained al Qaida family allowance information from November 2002 to October 2003.

p. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed al Qaida expense reports from January 2002 to December 2002.

q. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed al Qaida United States dollars fund serial account information from 1 January 2002 to 15 May 2002.

r. A laptop computer hard-drive associated with the detainee contained detailed al Qaida expense information through various incoming and outgoing rupee, Euro, riyal and dirham fund transactions for the period of 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.

NAME	'Ali 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Ali
PHONETICS	ah-Lee ahbd-al-ah-ZEEZ ah-LEE
KEY ALIAS	'Ammar al-Baluchi
AFFILIATION	Al-Qa'ida
NATIONALITY	Baluchi born and raised in Kuwait

Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida operative 'Ammar al-Baluchi is a member of an extended family of extremists that has spawned such notorious terrorists as his detained uncle and 11 September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) and cousin and incarcerated World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef. 'Ammar served as a key lieutenant for KSM during the operation on 11 September and subsequently assisted his uncle on various plots against the United States and United Kingdom.

'Ammar, who is 29 years old, spent most of his teen years in Iran before moving to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to work as a computer programmer in Dubai in 1998. Even before this move, he was gradually being influenced by his extremist relatives to become involved in terrorism; his chief mentor was Ramzi Yousef, who taught him in the early 1990s in Iran about the importance of war against the West. 'Ammar volunteered his services to KSM in 1997, and during 2000-2001 played an important role helping facilitate the operation on 11 September by transferring money to US-based operatives and acting as a travel facilitator to hijackers transiting the UAE on their way from Pakistan to the United States.

After the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001, 'Ammar assisted KSM in organizing the movement of al-Qa'ida operatives and their families to safehouses in Pakistan. KSM also directed him at the forefront of planning for a variety of terrorist plots against the West, including:

- In late 2001 in Afghanistan, KSM directed 'Ammar to be the communications intermediary between al-Qa'ida and "shoe bombers" Richard Reid and Saajid Badat. In early 2002 in Pakistan, 'Ammar helped KSM prepare operatives for travel to the United States, ostensibly to carry out attacks.
- During 2002-2003 'Ammar also worked with KSM to prepare Majid Khan and others for travel to the United States to conduct terrorist operations. 'Ammar also sent Khan in late 2002 to Thailand to deliver \$50,000 to finance plotting by Jemaah Islamiya leader Hambali against US and Israeli targets in Southeast Asia.
- From late 2002, 'Ammar began plotting to carry out simultaneous attacks in Karachi against the US Consulate, Western residences, and Westerners at the local airport. After KSM's detention, 'Ammar assumed responsibility for the plot to carry out hijacking attacks from Heathrow Airport but decided to delay that plot until after the bombings in Karachi occurred. He was within days of completing preparations for the Karachi plot when he was captured.
- In 2002, 'Ammar directed Aafia Siddiqui—a US-educated neuroscientist and al-Qa'ida facilitator—to travel to the United States to prepare paperwork to ease Majid Khan's deployment to the United States. 'Ammar married Siddiqui shortly before his detention.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 March 2007

TO: Personal Representative

FROM: OIC, CSRT (28 Mar 07)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW
TRIBUNAL – AL BALUCHI, AMMAR

1. Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated 14 July 2006, *Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine if the detainee is an enemy combatant.

2. An enemy combatant has been defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”

3. The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were: American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. At approximately 10:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania. These crashes and subsequent damage to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in the deaths of 2,972 persons in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

b. On or about 10 October 1998, the detainee opened a bank account at the Emirates Bank International. The detainee provided a Pakistani passport with number *E911562* as identification. The detainee’s passport listed the name of the bearer as “Mr. Ali, son of Mr. Abdul Aziz Ali,” (*Mr. Ali*). The detainee provided, “MEC Ltd. Post Office Box 16958, Jebel Ali, Dubai,” as his address.

c. On or about 8 August 2000, the detainee opened a bank account at the Dubai Islamic Bank. The detainee provided a Pakistani passport with number *E911562* as identification. The

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detainee's passport listed the name of the bearer as "Mr. Ali, son of Mr. Abdul Aziz Ali," (*Mr. Ali*). The account documents listed the detainee's phone number as 0506745651.

d. On or about 18 April 2000, a person named *Ali*, sent 5000 United States dollars from the Wall Street Exchange Centre in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Adel Rafeea. *Ali* listed the Post Office Box and phone number utilized by *the detainee*. The identification card of the sender of the money, photocopied by the Wall Street Exchange Centre, further identified the sender as *Mr. Ali*, a computer technician of Pakistani nationality with the passport number E911562.

e. On or about 4 June 2000, "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta purchased a Voicestream Wireless pre-paid telephone in Manhattan, New York. The phone was activated on 4 June 2000 and de-activated on 11 July 2000.

f. Between 28 and 30 June 2000, "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta's Voicestream cell phone used a calling card to make approximately sixteen calls to the detainee's phone number in the United Arab Emirates.

g. On 29 June 2000, "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi picked up a Western Union wire transfer in the amount of 5,000 United States dollars at the Western Union facility located at 1440 Broadway, New York, New York. The funds were sent by "Isam Mansar" from the U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates on 29 June 2000.

h. On 18 July 2000, "Isam Mansur" sent 10,000 United States dollars via a bank transfer from U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates to "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi's Suntrust Bank, Florida, account (a joint account with "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 19 July 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. Isam Mansur listed the same Post Office box number associated with the detainee.

i. On 5 August 2000, "Isam Mansour" sent 9,500 United States dollars via a bank to bank transfer from the U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates to "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi's Suntrust Bank, Florida, account (a joint account with "9/11 hijacker" Mohamed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 7 August 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. "Isam Mansour" listed the same Post Office box number associated with the detainee.

j. On 29 August 2000, *Mr. Ali* sent 20,000 United States dollars via bank to bank transfer from U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to "9/11 hijacker" Marwan Al-Shehhi's Suntrust Bank, Florida, account (a joint account with "9/11 hijacker" Mohammed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 30 August 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. *Mr. Ali* listed a phone number one digit off of the phone number listed by "Isam Mansour" on 5 August 2000.

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k. On 17 September 2000, “Hani (Fawaz Trading)” sent 70,000 United States dollars via a bank to bank transfer from the U.A.E. Exchange Centre, Bur Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Marwan Al-Shehhi’s Suntrust Bank, Florida account (a joint account with “9/11 hijacker” Mohammed Atta). The funds posted to the Suntrust account on 18 September 2000 less a 15 United States dollar fee. “Hani (Fawaz Trading)” listed the same phone number that “*Mr. Ali*” listed on the 29 August 2000 transfer documents.

l. During an August 2002 Federal Bureau of Investigation interview, Abdul Samad Din Mohammed, told the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the detainee was in constant contact with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the detainee’s uncle. Abdul Samad Din Mohammed also stated the detainee would constantly receive Arab visitors from Pakistan at the Airport.

m. During an August 2002 interview, Abdul Samad Din Mohammed (Mohammed), stated the detainee left the United Arab Emirates on 9 September 2001 or 10 September 2001. The detainee did not have all his belongings together, but insisted on leaving. Mohammed asked the detainee why he was in such a rush to leave, but did not receive a satisfactory answer.

n. The detainee discussed the smuggling of explosives into the United States through an import and export textile company in New York, with another individual.

o. The detainee was arrested in possession of a compact disk which contained a letter addressed to Usama bin Laden. The disk also contained two photographic images of the World Trade Center when United Airlines flight 175 crashed into the south tower.

p. The detainee was captured on 29 April 2003 in Karachi, Pakistan, as he waited for the delivery of explosives for an alleged plot against the United States consulate in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was in possession of a perfume spray bottle which contained a low concentration of cyanide when he was arrested.

q. The detainee’s pocket litter included a letter from unidentified Saudi Arabian scholars to Usama bin Ladin. The letter discussed al Qaida’s strategy in the War on Terror.

4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant and that is deemed relevant to that issue. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability and relevance of evidence or witnesses.